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Note

Workmen's Compensation-A New "In
the Course of Employment" Concept
Eliker v. D.H. Merritt & Sons, 195 Neb. 154, 237 N.W.2d 130
(1975).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Eliker v. D.H. Merritt & Sons,' the Nebraska supreme court
held that workmen's compensation should be denied to a claimant
who offered proof that he received a back injury while engaged
in his usual work activities, but who failed to show exactly what he
was doing at the time of the injury. The court found that the
claimant had failed to satisfy the requirement that the injury
arise out of and in the course of the employment. 2 This represents a new interpretation of the requirement that the employee's
injury occur "in the course of employment." The new interpretation introduces factors which before were relevant only to the
requirement that the employee experience an "accident." In
reaching its decision, the court reviewed the trial court's findings
of fact, and thus departed from the established standard of review
for workmen's compensation cases.
This note will examine the Eliker decision in the context of prior
case law and statutory amendments to determine the effect of the
holding on substantive and procedural aspects of workmen's compensation in Nebraska.
f. THE CASE
The plaintiff, Adam Charlie Eliker, was employed as a yard
foreman by D.H. Merritt & Sons, a building supply company.
Eliker's duties included loading and unloading one-hundred-pound
sacks of sand, plaster, and cement. The work involved extensive
bending, stooping, and twisting.
On the day in question, the plaintiff went to work at 7 a.m.,
feeling fine. At about 9 a.m. his neck began to hurt, but he was
1. 195 Neb. 154, 237 N.W.2d 130 (1975).

2. Id. at 160, 237 N.W.2d at 134.
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unable to pinpoint exactly what he was doing at the time the pain
started. 3 By midafternoon the pain was so great that Eliker left
work. The next day he was hospitalized and remained there for a
week. He went back to work two weeks after his release from the
hospital. The day after his return he passed out while working and
was taken home. He later returned to the hospital, where a myelogram was performed, revealing a herniated disc. The attending
physician testified that he believed, with reasonable medical certainty, that the injury was related to the plaintiff's work activity.
After a hearing before a single judge of the compensation court,
the action was dismissed. Upon rehearing, the court en banc
reversed and awarded compensation for medical bills, temporary
total and permanent partial disability. This award was affirmed
by the district court on appeal.
The Nebraska supreme court reversed and dismissed on the
grounds that the plaintiff had failed to establish that the accident
arose out of and in the course of the employment.
Justice McCown dissented, stating that the reversal was based
on a re-evaluation of factual determinations that were adequately
supported by the evidence, and which, therefore, should not have
been disturbed on appeal.4
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S REASONING
The court began its analysis from the basic premise that in any
compensation case the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the disability was caused by an
accident arising out of and in the course of employment. Three
material elements must be established: 6 (1) that an accident
occurred, (2) that the accident caused the disability, and (3) that
the accident arose out of and in the course of employment.
In Eliker, the court's interpretation of the "arising out of and in
the course of" requirement re-established the necessity of proof of
3. When asked what he was doing at the time the pain came on, Eliker
answered, "All of the normal work that I usually always do." Asked
to describe what that was, he replied, "Well, lifting the bags and
all the other-all the other work that there is there to do." Id.
at 156, 237 N.W.2d at 132.
4. Id. at 161, 237 N.W.2d at 135.

5. Id. at 157, 237 N.W.2d at 133. This rule is well established in workmen's compensation law. See, e.g., Satterfield v. Nagel, 186 Neb. 332,
333, 183 N.W.2d 237, 240 (1971); Schoenrock v. School Dist., 179 Neb.

621, 623, 139 N.W.2d 547, 549 (1966); Wheeler v. Northwestern Metal
Co., 175 Neb. 841, 845, 124 N.W.2d 377, 380 (1963).
6. Dike v. Betz, 181 Neb. 580, 587, 149 N.W.2d 750, 754 (1967).
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a specific external event, a requirement that was legislated out of
7
th statutory definition of "accident" in 1963.
A. The Accident Requirement
The original version of the Nebraska Workmen's Compensation
Act defined an accident as "an unexpected or unforeseen event
happening suddenly and violently, with or without human fault,
and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury."8
Early cases decided under this statutory definition held that an
unexpected internal injury was compensable whether or not it was
caused by an external event.9 After 1941, however, the Nebraska
supreme court consistently held that proof that some external
event-a slip, trip, fall, or exertion greater than that normally
incident to the employment-had caused the injury was necessary
to satisfy the accident requirement as defined by statute. 10
In 1963, the workmen's compensation statute was amended and
the definition of accident was changed to "an unexpected or unforeseen injury happening suddenly and violently, with or without
human fault, and producing at the time objective symptoms of an
injury."" The modification was intended to eliminate the requirement of an external event as a condition precedent to compensation
for an injury, and to re-establish that any unexpected injury arising
out of and in the course of the employment should be compensable
12
under the statute.
7. See Section II-A infra.
8. See Act of Apr. 21, 1913, ch. 198, § 52(b), [19131 Neb. Laws 601.

9. See, e.g., Dymak v. Haskins Bros., 132 Neb. 308, 312, 271 N.W. 860, 862
(1937).
10. See, e.g., Pruitt v. McMaken Transp. Co., 175 Neb. 477, 480, 122
N.W.2d 236, 239 (1963).
11. Act of July 5, 1963, ch. 287, § 1, [19633 Neb. Laws 862, amending NEB.
Rnv. STAT. § 48-151 (Reissue 1960) (emphasis added.)
12. See Gradwohl, Workmen's Compensation: An Analysis of Nebraska's
Revised "Accident" Requirement, 43 NEs. L. REv. 27 (1963), in which

the author states:

The overwhelming legislative purpose behind the 1963
amendment was to eliminate the arbitrary factual situations
arising under the slip, trip or fall rules which preclude recovery for work injuries caused by ordinary exertion or
strain.... The injured workman who can prove factually
that his employment caused him injury should be entitled to
compensation regardless of whether the injury involved an
internal body failure or external cause.
Id. at 35. This intent was expressed in the Statement of the Judiciary

Committee on LB 497:
At one time the Nebraska court favored the more liberal
rule which is law in a great majority of the states; but in
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This rule was recognized in Harmon v. City of Omaha,13 a 1968
case, in which the Nebraska court stated:
The substitution of the word injury for event has eliminated the
necessity of proof of an event external to the body as a cause of
the injury. The effect of the amendment is to liberalize the act
and bring it into conformity with the compensation laws of many
other states.14
Apparently the evidence in Harmon linked the injury to a specific
activity of the claimant. 15 However, the same general rule was
applied a year later in Brokaw v. Robinson16 to allow compensation when the testimony did not conclusively link the claimant's
injury to any specific event. 17 Regarding the accident requirement,
the court stated:
The change in the workmen's compensation statute clearly removes
the necessity of finding a single traumatic event as the cause of
an injury. The "by accident" requirement of the Workmen's Compensation Act is now satisfied, either if the cause was of an accidental character, or if the effect was unforeseen, and happened
suddenly and violently.' 8
The court in Eiiker recognized this standard for determining
the accidental nature of an injury, and conceded that the injury
was the result of an accident.' 9

13.
14.
15.

16.
17.

18.
19.

the last two decades our Supreme Court has construed, generally, that inner bodily injuries caused by exertion are not
compensable unless the employee obtains such in connection
with a slip, trip, or fall.
This narrow court interpretation does not do justice in
many cases and is not in harmony with the majority of opinions in other states under workmen's compensation law.
Hearings on L.B. 497 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, Neb.
Legis., 73d Sess., Committee Statement (May 22, 1963).
183 Neb. 352, 160 N.W.2d 189 (1968).
Id. at 354, 160 N.W.2d at 191.
The opinion does not indicate what testimony was offered, but the
court's summary of the facts indicates that the claimant's back injury
was related to an accident occurring when she bent down to pick up
some wire baskets from the floor.
183 Neb. 760, 164 N.W.2d 461 (1969).
In Brokaw, the plaintiff, a farm worker, experienced physical strain
after moving a portable cattle chute. He finished work that day,
but when he awoke the next morning it was discovered that he had
suffered a stroke. Physicians' testimony to the effect that moving
the chute may have been a factor contributing to the stroke was held
sufficient to support an award of benefits. Id. at 762-63, 164 N.W.2d
at 464.
Id. at 763, 164 N.W.2d at 464.
195 Neb. at 158, 237 N.W.2d at 133.
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B.

Causation
The second material element which the plaintiff must prove is
that the accident caused the disability in question. Eliker's doctor
testified that he definitely believed that the injury was traumarelated, and that he believed with reasonable medical certainty
that the injury was "definitely related" to the plaintiff's work
activity. If there was any question as to whether this testimony
was sufficient to meet judicial standards for causation, 20 the court
made no mention of failure of proof in this area as a possible basis
for its denial of compensation. 21 Furthermore, there was no indication that the plaintiff's evidence was contradicted or inconsistent
as has often been true in cases where the proof of causation has
22
been insufficient.
C. Arising Out of and in the Course of Employment
The basis of the court's holding was that Eliker had failed to
prove that the accident arose out of and occurred in the course of
his employment. The terms are used conjunctively in the Nebraska
statute, and a claimant must prove both factors before compensation
will be awarded. 28 The Nebraska supreme court has often stated
that whether an accident arises out of and in the course of employment must be determined by the facts of each case, 24 and that there
20. See Welke v. City of Ainsworth, 179 Neb. 496, 138 N.W.2d 808 (1965),
where the Nebraska supreme court held testimony that an accident
"could have caused" the injury and that the injury was "probably
due" to the accident sufficient to establish causation. The court
stated that to require a greater degree of proof in a workmen's compensation case than in a tort case would be to thwart the purpose
of the workmen's compensation statute. Id. at 503, 138 N.W.2d at 811.
21. The court, basing its holding on other grounds, did not explicitly
state whether the evidence established causation. The opinion quoted

a doctor's testimony that Eliker's injury could have been caused by

a cough or a sneeze. It was, however, the opinion of the same doctor
that the injury was "definitely related to his work activity." 195 Neb.
at 159, 237 N.W.2d at 134. Justice McCown, in a dissenting opinion,
noted that the only medical testimony on the record was "that the
injury was, in fact, caused by the employment." Id. at 161, 237
N.W.2d at 135.
22. See, e.g., Kastanek v. Wilding, 181 Neb. 348, 148 N.W.2d 201 (1967);
Meadows v. Skinner Mfg. Co., 178 Neb. 856, 136 N.W.2d 184 (1965);
Carranza v. Paine-Larson Furniture Co., 165 Neb. 352, 85 N.W.2d 694
(1957).
23. Reis v. Douglas County Hosp., 193 Neb. 542, 549, 227 N.W.2d 879, 884
(1975); Appleby v. Great Western Sugar Co., 176 Neb. 102, 106, 125
N.W.2d 103, 106 (1963).
24. See Reis v. Douglas County Hosp., 193 Neb. 542, 549, 227 N.W.2d 879,

884 (1975); Johnson v. Hahn Bros. Constr., 188 Neb. 252, 257, 196
N.W.2d 109, 112 (1972); Oline v. Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 177 Neb.
851, 860, 131 N.W.2d 410, 416 (1964).
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is no fixed formula by which the question may be resolved. 25
In Eliker, the court stated that the issue was controlled by the
decision in Reis v. Douglas County Hospital.26 In that case, the
plaintiff sought compensation for a heart attack which occurred at
home, and which, according to her doctor's testimony, was caused
by her activities as a hospital personnel director. The court denied
compensation on the grounds that the "arising out of" and "in the
course of" requirements were not met:
Nowhere have we been able to find any testimony indicating that
the plaintiff had suffered any myocardial infarction or chest pains
at her place of employment, or while performing
services for her
employer. This, we believe, is a fatal deficiency. 27
This holding followed the rule of an earlier case, Hammond v.
Doctor's Hospital,28 where a claimant was denied compensation for
an infection resulting from a pin prick, on the ground that the
plaintiff had no recollection of when she pricked her finger. The
court held that she had not met the "arising, out of" and "in the
course of" requirements, there having been no evidence as to when,
how, and where the injury occurred.
Eliker's testimony, which was apparently consistent, uncontradicted, and credible, established that the onset of the injury
occurred while the plaintiff was at work, performing his usual
duties, during his regular hours of employment. Thus the "fatal
deficiency" of the Reis case was not present, and it is unclear how
that case can be considered as controlling precedent for the decision in Eliker.29 Rather than representing an extension of the
holding in Reis, the decision reflects a new interpretation of the
"arising out of" and "in the course of" requirements.
Traditionally, the phrase "arising out of" has referred to the
origin or cause of the accident.30 Where an injury has occurred
25. Johnson v. Hahn Bros. Constr., 188 Neb. 252, 257, 196 N.W.2d 109, 112
(1972); Oline v. Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 177 Neb. 851, 860, 131
N.W.2d 410, 416 (1964).
26. 193 Neb. 542, 227 N.W.2d 879 (1975).
27. Id. at 551, 227 N.W.2d at 885.
28. 145 Neb. 446, 17 N.W.2d 9 (1945).
29. The applicability of Reis, a heart-attack case, is especially questionable considering the fact that the Nebraska supreme court has developed special requirements for heart-attack cases. In such cases, the
plaintiff must show that the risk of heart trouble was greater while
he was employed than it would have been if he had been unemployed.
Conn v. ITL, Inc., 187 Neb. 112, 116, 187 N.W.2d 641, 643-44 (1971);
Beck v. State, 184 Neb. 477, 480, 168 N.W.2d 532, 533 (1969).

30. See Johnson v. Hahn Bros. Constr., 188 Neb. 252, 257, 196 N.W.2d 109
112 (1972).
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while the claimant was performing duties required by the employment and benefiting the employer, there usually has been no question that the injury arose out of the employment.3 ' Thus, the evidence in Eliker as to the origin of the accident should have been
sufficient to satisfy the "arising out of" requirement as interpreted
in past decisions.
The "in the course of" concept refers to the time, place, and
circumstances of the accident. 82 In prior cases, this requirement
has been satisfied by showing that the injury occurred while the
claimant was on the premises of the employer during working
hours.3 3 However, in Eliker, the court held that the plaintiff's proof
failed:
It is true that the plaintiff said that his neck pains came on suddenly while at work.... There is no evidence, however, as to
exactly what he was doing at the time of the onsent of the pain.
To hold for the plaintiff herein would require us by judicial
prove the
fiat to legislate out the requirement that the claimant 34
accident occurred in the course of his or her employment.
The court's holding in effect reinstated the requirement of an
external event that had been legislated out of compensation law by
the 1963 amendment of the definition of "accident." Requiring
specific proof of what events preceded the accident may be beneficial as an aid to the employer in defending against the plaintiff's
claim and in limiting the potential for fraudulent claims. However,
where there is clear and uncontradicted evidence that the injury
was work-connected, compensation should be allowed if the beneficent purposes of the act are to be fulfilled.3 5

D. Standard of Review
Under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act in
effect at the time Eliker was decided, a compensation case was
31. The concept has been expanded to include all acts performed within
the scope of the employment. Thus, reasonable measures taken by
an employee for personal convenience are considered as arising out
of the employment. Uzendoski v. City of Fullerton, 177 Neb. 779,
782, 131 N.W.2d 193, 196 (1964).
32. Johnson v. Hahn Bros. Constr., 188 Neb. 252, 257, 196 N.W.2d 109, 112
(1972).
33. Uzendoski v. City of Fullerton, 177 Neb. 779, 781, 131 N.W.2d 193, 195
(1964).
34. 195 Neb. at 160-61, 237 N.W.2d at 134-35.
35. Thomsen v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 192 Neb. 236, 243, 219 N.W.2d 746,
750 (1974); Runyan v. State, 179 Neb. 371, 376, 138 N.W.2d 484, 488
(1964).
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initially heard by a single judge of the compensation court and
could be appealed either to the compensation court en banc or to
the district court. In either case, the rehearing was de novo and a
record was made. If the rehearing was by the compensation court
en banc, appeal could then be taken to the district court, and any
district court decision could be appealed to the Nebraska supreme
court. In 1975, the legislature amended the Workmen's Compensation Act to provide for direct appeal to the supreme court from
rulings by the compensation court en banc. 3 6
In early cases, appellate review was in the nature of an error
proceeding at the district court level, but the supeme court review
was de novo upon the record.3 7 Even so, the court developed the
rule that where conflicting evidence was resolved at the trial level
according to the demeanor and credibility of witnesses, those findings would be considered correct on de novo review in the supreme
38

court.

In a 1971 case, Gifford v. Ag Lime, Sand & Gravel Co.,3 9 the
court held that, -pursuant to a 1953 amendment to the statute
regarding the standard of review on appeal to the supreme court,
such appeals should no longer be decided de novo upon the record:
De novo review implies an independent determination of the facts
without restriction by any previous factual determinations made
in the lower court. While the distinction may be a technical one,
it is nevertheless a vital one. Appellate courts do not ordinarily
determine factual issues de novo except when required by statute.
We therefore hold that on appeal of a workmen's compensation
case to the Supreme Court, if there is reasonable competent evi36. See Act of May 9, 1975, LB 187, § 14, [1975] Neb. Laws 351, amending
NEa. Rnv. STAT. § 48-185 (Reissue 1974) (now NEs. REv. STAT. §
48-185 (Cum. Supp. 1976)).
37. The criteria for allowing a modification of the district court award
by the supreme court were as follows:
(1) The court acted without or in excess of its powers,
(2) the judgment order or award was procured by fraud,
(3) the findings of fact are not supported by the evidence
as disclosed by the record, and, if so found, the cause shall
be considered de novo upon the record ....

(4) the find-

ings of fact by the court do not support the order or award.
Act of Mar. 23, 1957, ch. 207, § 1, [1957] Neb. Laws 726 (repealed
1975). Under this statute, cases were reviewed in the supreme court
de novo upon the record. See Schoenrock v. School Dist., 179 Neb.
621, 139 N.W.2d 547 (1966); Runyan v. State, 179 Neb. 371, 138 N.W.2d
484 (1964); Werner v. Nebraska Power Co., 149 Neb. 408, 31 N.W.2d
315 (1948).

38. See Meadows v. Skinner Mfg. Co., 178 Neb. 856, 136 N.W.2d 184
(1965).
39. 187 Neb. 57, 187 N.W.2d 285 (1971).
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dence to support the findings of fact in the trial court, the judgment, order or award will40not be modified or set aside for
insufficiency of the evidence.

In Eilker, consistent and uncontradicted evidence supported the
findings of fact leading to the award of compensation. Under the
standard of review set out in Gifford, the case should have been
affirmed, but the court reversed without mentioning the Gifford
case. As Justice McCown stated in his dissenting opinion:
Only factual issues are involved here. Both the Workmen's
Compensation Court en banc and the District Court, on appeal,
determined those factual issues in favor of the claimant, and there
is reasonable competent evidence in the record to support these
The opinion ignores the rules set out by
findings of fact ....
this court in Gifford v. Ag Lime, Sand and Gravel.41
Along with providing for direct appeal to the supreme court
from rulings by the compensation court en banc, the 1975 amendments to the Workmen's Compensation Act included a modification
of the standard of review on appeal. No provision was made for
de novo review in the supreme court, and the intended effect was
to limit review to questions of law. 4 2 If Eliker means that the
court is likely to reconsider factual determinations made by the
trial court, the result could impair the intent of the direct appeal
amendment to encourage speedy resolution of cases and avoid
unnecessary delay and expense,4 3 because more parties may appeal
if there is a chance for a reconsideration of the facts. However, if
the court construes the revised standard of review provision in
accordance with the legislative intent to limit review to errors of
law, Eliker will have little effect on the standards for reviewing
factual determinations.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In Eliker, the court held that in order to satisfy the "in the
course of employment" requirement of the Workmen's Compensation Act the claimant must show exactly what activity he was
engaged in at the time of the injury. Proof that the claimant was
40. Id. at 63-64, 187 N.W.2d at 289. The court in the past has consistently
applied this standard. See Smith v. Ruan Transp., Inc., 190 Neb. 509,
512, 209 N.W.2d 146, 149 (1973); Hartwig v. Educational Serv. Unit
No. 13, 189 Neb. 339, 341, 202 N.W.2d 618, 620 (1972); Swartz v. Hess,
Inc., 188 Neb. 542, 545, 198 N.W.2d 64, 66 (1972); Bole v. S.M.S.
Trucking Co., 187 Neb. 341, 342, 190 N.W.2d 780, 781 (1971).
41. 195 Neb. at 161, 237 N.W.2d at 135.
42. See Hearings on LB 187 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Neb.
Leg., 1st Sess., at 26 (1975).
43. See id. at 27.
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performing his usual duties on the premises of the employer during
the hours of employment was found insufficient to establish a
temporal and space nexus with the employment. Although the
actual effect of the case may be limited by the fact that in most
instances the plaintiff will be able to introduce evidence of the
specific activity he was engaged in at the time of the injury, the
holding does represent a new interpretation of the "in the course
of employment" concept.
The effect of the ruling on the standard of review in compensation cases will depend upon the court's interpretation of the recent
amendments to the statute calling for review on questions of law
only. However, the court's ruling did circumvent the well-established standard set down in the Gifford case, without so much as
mentioning that case. If in future cases the court reconsiders the
facts of compensation cases on appeal, the intended effect of the
direct appeal amendment may be frustrated.
Sally Johnson '77

